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Before proceeding, I want to emphasize that
the views I express here are mine and do not
necessarily reflect official positions of the Federal
Reserve System. I thank my colleagues at the
Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis for their com-
ments, especially Christopher Wheeler, senior
economist in the Research Division, who provided
special assistance. However, I retain full respon-
sibility for errors.
THE FRAMEWORK
Economists analyze trends in total labor input
by examining components of the total. We typi-
cally start with population growth. Then, we
examine the fraction of the population at work
or seeking work. The sum of those employed
and those unemployed is the labor force. The
participation rate is the fraction, usually expressed
as a percentage, of the labor force in the popula-
tion. The next step is to examine the split of the
labor force between employment and unemploy-
ment. Finally, we need to examine the behavior
of average hours of work of those employed. This
analytical framework provides a way to study
changes over time in the total hours of labor input
in the economy.
Of these various analytical components,
population growth and fluctuations in the labor
force participation rate are quantitatively most
important for understanding changes in total
hours of labor input over a span of a few years or
more. However, fluctuations in the unemployment
rate are particularly important for understanding
business cycle fluctuations lasting a few quarters
or a year or two. We also know that when business
A
major issue facing the U.S. economy
in coming years, and facing those of
us who have to try to understand the
evolution of the economy, is the prob-
able growth rate of labor input. The issue arises
because the first wave of the baby-boom genera-
tion is now beginning to retire. If those reaching
retirement age in the near future retire at the
same rate as those reaching retirement age over
the past ten years or so, then labor force growth
will decline dramatically. In this case, the num-
ber of those retiring will almost match the num-
ber of young persons plus immigrants entering
the labor force. In that case, the U.S. labor force
will grow only very slowly. Conversely, with
only a relatively small change in retirement pat-
terns, labor force growth could be substantially
higher than suggested by retirement patterns
observed in the recent past. Estimates of labor
force growth for coming years—even as soon as
next year—by various experts differ by a factor
of two. That is an enormous discrepancy.
Labor force growth matters for a number of
reasons. The trend of total GDP growth is deter-
mined by the trend of hours worked and growth
of output per hour, or productivity. The growth
of government revenues, including revenues flow-
ing into the Social Security and Medicare systems,
depends centrally on the growth of total national
output. In the context of short-run business cycle
analysis, we in the Federal Reserve will have to
reach judgments about whether observed employ-
ment growth is outrunning, or falling short, of
labor force growth. I’ll return to some of the
implications of uncertainty over labor force
growth in my concluding remarks.conditions turn soft, labor force participation
declines. Some who lose their jobs drop out of
the labor force rather than continue to look
actively for work. In the reports compiled by the
Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS), active job search
is required for a person not working to be classi-
fied as unemployed rather than not in the labor
force.
Given the dramatic changes that are ahead of
us as the baby-boom generation begins to retire,
it makes sense to look closely at issues surround-
ing likely future labor force participation.
The total labor force participation rate is
measured each month by the BLS as the fraction
of the civilian, non-institutional population aged
16 years or older who are either working or
actively seeking work. The participation rate
provides a sense of how engaged in work the
U.S. population is. High levels indicate that a
large fraction of the adult population is either
situated in a job or is looking for one. We can
interpret a high rate of participation, therefore,
as an indication that the potential supply of labor
is large relative to the size of the working-age
population.
Labor force participation in the United States
has shown two striking trends over the past 50
years: a long-run increase in the decades follow-
ing World War II and a significant decline over the
past six years. It is this latter trend, the decline,
that has attracted so much attention among econ-
omists recently, in part because it represents a
significant break with the past and in part because
there are potentially significant long-run conse-
quences associated with it. With a decreasing
fraction of the adult population engaged in work,
our economy will have fewer individuals pro-
ducing income and output relative to the total
number of residents in the country. In this case,
the output of each worker will have to sustain the
consumption of a larger number of individuals.
Improving on, or even simply maintaining, our
per capita standard of living, therefore, will
become a more difficult goal to achieve in the
face of declining labor force participation.
TRENDS IN LABOR FORCE
PARTICIPATION
To begin the analysis, consider how participa-
tion rates have evolved in the United States over
the past half century. The BLS has compiled
monthly statistics on labor force participation
dating back to 1948. These figures are based on a
survey that at present covers approximately
60,000 households.
What is by far the most noticeable trend in
these statistics is the overall increase in the par-
ticipation rate since 1948. In January of 1948,
the overall rate of labor force participation in the
United States was roughly 59 percent. This figure
held steady until the early 1960s, when it began
to rise, reaching 61 percent in 1975, 65 percent
in 1985, and just over 66 percent in 1995. During
the first quarter of 2000, the labor force participa-
tion rate reached its highest level in the history
of the series, hitting 67.3 percent of the working-
age population.
Over the past six years, however, there has
been a notable decrease. Labor force participa-
tion dropped from 67.3 percent in early 2000 to
65.8 percent in the first quarter of 2005. It has
since risen to just over 66 percent. The most recent
figure available at the time of this writing—that
for October of 2006—was 66.2 percent. In absolute
terms, this 1 percentage point drop in the partici-
pation rate since 2000 corresponds to a decrease
in the size of the labor force of more than 2 mil-
lion individuals relative to what it otherwise
would have been.
SOME EXPLANATIONS
How do we explain these trends, both the
increase between 1965 and 2000, and the decrease
thereafter? Most of the increase in labor force
participation after 1960 can be attributed to the
growing presence of women in the labor market.
In 1950, roughly one in three women 16 years
of age or older participated in the labor force.
By 1998, nearly 60 percent did. Although this
increase occurred in most age groups, it was par-
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the ages of 25 and 54; that is, women in the so-
called “prime” working years. Among these
women, the rate of participation rose from less
than 40 percent in 1950 to more than 75 percent
by the end of the 1990s.1
As many economists have observed, this
increase in women’s participation has been the
product of several elements. The improvement
in household technologies simplified many daily
tasks, such as cooking and cleaning, thereby
giving those responsible for carrying them out
greater time to pursue other activities, including
work outside of the home (Hotchkiss, 2005).
Medical advances provided women with greater
control over their child-bearing decisions, allow-
ing them to focus to a greater extent on education
and the pursuit of a career (Goldin, 2004). Evolv-
ing social norms also made it more acceptable
for women to delay marriage and concentrate on
both schooling and work, to work while married
and to work while raising small children
(Aaronson et al., 2006). Such changes also opened
doors to careers in fields such as business, law
and medicine, as well as increased levels of com-
pensation, both in absolute terms and relative to
the earnings of men (Goldin, 2004).
The participation of men in the labor force,
in contrast, has shown a gradual decrease in the
last half century, dropping from more than 85
percent in 1948 to less than 75 percent today. As
with the rise in female participation rates, there
are likely many reasons for the decline in men’s
labor force participation. The creation of the
Social Security System in 1935, the rise in the
provision of private pensions following the
Revenue Act of 1942 and greater generosity in
disability insurance, for example, may have
encouraged men to retire earlier (Hotchkiss, 2005).
The drop in men’s participation may also be tied
to the rise in women’s participation if married
couples view men’s and women’s labor market
activity as substitutes. A cynic might say that
women increased their labor force participation
so men can retire early.
Of course, the fact that the overall rate of par-
ticipation increased during the latter half of the
20th century indicates that the rise in women’s
participation greatly outweighed the decline
among men. When viewed from this perspective,
the rise in female labor force participation was a
crucial aspect of the rise in overall labor input
and, thus, the rapid expansion of the U.S. econ-
omy during the latter half of the 20th century.
The second and more distressing trend in the
participation rate is the significant decline since
the first quarter of 2000. Recall that in the past
six years, the participation rate has dropped by
roughly one percentage point, implying a decrease
in the size of the labor force of approximately 2
million workers. To be sure, some of this turn-
around can be linked to the recession of 2001.
Economists have long observed that labor force
participation tends to be procyclical: it decreases
when the economy weakens and increases when
it strengthens.
However, the persistent decrease in the par-
ticipation rate during the economic recovery
since 2001 has led many economists to believe
that there are longer-run, structural changes at
play. The most salient of these changes is the
aging of the U.S. labor force associated with the
baby-boom generation. This group, born between
1946 and 1964, has been estimated to comprise
roughly 78 million individuals and, consequently,
represents more than a third of the adult non-
institutional population. In 2000, boomers were
between the ages of 36 and 54—an age range with
a particularly high rate of labor force participa-
tion. In 2000, approximately 92 percent of men
and 77 percent of women in this age category
participated in the labor market (Toossi, 2005).
In addition to the expanding U.S. economy during
the 1990s, this demographic feature of the labor
force likely contributed to the peaking of the
participation rate at this time.
However, after 2000 the baby-boom genera-
tion began to move into age categories with sub-
stantially lower rates of labor force participation.
Recent participation rates among men 55 to 59
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1 These figures are derived from the Bureau of Labor Statistics: http://www.bls.gov/opub/ted/2000/feb/wk3/art03.htm.years of age, a group into which the boomers
became increasingly represented between 2001
and 2006, averaged 77 percent while the partici-
pation rate for women was 66 percent (Aaronson
et al., 2006). As individuals age beyond 60, par-
ticipation rates typically fall even further.
The aging of the baby-boom generation, how-
ever, only represents one part of the recent decline
in labor force participation. A sizable part of the
decline can be attributed to changes in the behav-
ior of workers at the opposite end of the age dis-
tribution: teens. Between 2000 and 2003, labor
force participation among workers between the
ages of 16 and 19 dropped by 7.5 percentage
points. Since that time, there has been no ten-
dency for teen participation to rebound, and
current rates are hovering around 44 percent
(Aaronson, Park and Sullivan, 2006).
Economists looking into this trend have
identified a number of possible explanations,
and most begin, once again, with the 2001 reces-
sion. Because teen workers have a somewhat
tenuous connection to the labor market, they are
particularly sensitive to economic downturns. It
is, therefore, not surprising that their participa-
tion rates dropped off significantly as the U.S.
economy entered recession in 2001.
The fact that the number of teens in the labor
force has not rebounded in spite of the recovery
over the past 5 years, however, suggests that there
are longer-run, structural factors beneath this
decline. The downward trend in teen participa-
tion since the late 1970s further supports this
notion. As it turns out, there appears to be one
particularly important reason for this change:
education.
In 1987, the percentage of individuals
between 16 and 19 years of age who were enrolled
in school was roughly 61 percent but rose to 73
percent in 2005. This is a very substantial increase
and by comparing 2005 with 1987, years with
similar overall labor market conditions, the
increase is not distorted by different cyclical
conditions in the labor market. In part, the surge
in school enrollment can be linked to the increase
in the economic return to schooling since the
late 1970s, particularly the payoff associated with
a college degree. Yet, it may also derive from the
expansion of educational opportunities, particu-
larly at the post-secondary level (Aaronson, Park
and Sullivan, 2006) as well as the evolution of
social norms that place a greater emphasis on
schooling than in years past.
THE FUTURE OF LABOR FORCE
PARTICIPATION
What do these trends in labor force participa-
tion imply about the future of U.S. labor supply
and about the prospects for continued growth in
our collective standard of living?
The aging of the population, of course, should
continue to decrease aggregate labor force partic-
ipation, and therefore, the potential supply of
labor in the United States. As I mentioned before,
the baby-boom cohort began to enter the 55-and-
older age category back in 2001, indicating that
the fraction of workers beyond their prime work-
ing years will steadily rise in the years ahead. A
BLS study projects that over the next eight years
the fraction of individuals over the age of 55 will
rise to more than one third of the adult population
from a level of 29 percent today (Toossi, 2005).
The Census Bureau projects this figure to rise to
more than 38 percent by 2030. On the other hand,
the fraction of the population in prime working
years—that is, between 25 and 54—is projected
to decrease from approximately 53 percent today
to 51 percent by 2014 and 45 percent by 2030.
Given the lower participation rates among
older workers, these trends suggest that the frac-
tion of the U.S. population either working or
looking for a job will decrease in the coming
decades. In 2005, the participation rate among
men aged 55 to 59 was more than 77 percent.
Among men 10 years older, 65 to 69, the rate was
less than half this figure: 33.5 percent. For men
70 and older, the participation rate was only 13.5
percent (Aaronson et al., 2006). Assuming that
this general pattern of participation continues to
hold, the aging of the U.S. population will nec-
essarily produce further declines in potential
labor supply.
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at current levels. In fact, there are a number of
reasons to expect participation rates among older
workers to rise somewhat in the coming years.
First, the age at which workers may draw full
benefits from Social Security is, under current
law, increasing. The full retirement age is 65 for
individuals born in 1937 or earlier, 66 for those
born between 1943 and 1954, and 67 for individ-
uals born in 1960 or later. Furthermore, workers
who choose to delay retirement until age 70 are
eligible for higher benefits. Social Security bene-
fits used to be reduced when a person receiving
benefits also had earned income, but that tax-like
provision has been eliminated. These provisions
in the law, taken together, may encourage some
workers to retire later than has been true of those
reaching retirement age in the recent past. How-
ever, it remains to be seen how large the effect
might be.
Second, the rate at which Social Security
benefits are growing has slowed, particularly
when compared with the decades prior to the
mid-1980s. According to data from the Social
Security Administration, real average monthly
benefits rose by 88 percent between 1965 and
1985. Between 1985 and 2004, they increased by
23 percent.2 Social Security benefits today repre-
sent a substantial fraction of the average house-
hold’s retirement income—indeed, Social Security
benefits represent more than half of total income
for 65 percent of the beneficiaries (Social Security
Bulletin: Annual Statistical Supplement, 2005).
Given this fact, the decreased rate of growth in
benefits over time may lead some retirees to sup-
plement their Social Security benefits. Taking a
job, of course, is one possible option. Reaching
retirement age may not necessarily mean retire-
ment. Some may seek another career, or partial
retirement.
A third development that could increase the
labor force participation rate among older work-
ers is increased life expectancy. Since 1970, life
expectancy for 65-year-olds in the United States
has risen by nearly four years for men and three
years for women.3 With greater numbers of pro-
ductive years, individuals may decide to lengthen
their careers.
Fourth, older workers may choose to remain
employed longer to maintain health insurance
coverage. Surveys by the Kaiser Family Founda-
tion and the Health Research and Educational
Trust have suggested that the fraction of firms
offering retiree health insurance to their workers
decreased by one half between 1988 and 2005
(Aaronson et al., 2006). Because workers, in gen-
eral, do not qualify for Medicare until age 65,
this development may also encourage workers to
delay retirement until age 65.
Indeed, we may have already seen some of
the effects of these changes. Among all age groups,
only that for workers 55 years of age or older has
shown a significant increase in participation
since 2000.
Nevertheless, it is almost certain that we will
see a decrease in the growth of total labor supply
over the next several decades. Even though we
might reasonably project increases in participation
among older Americans, rates of participation
among those 55 years of age and older will still
be substantially lower than among individuals
of prime working age. Hence, as our population
grows older, overall participation will decline.
On this point, researchers tend to agree. Although
the exact projections of organizations such as the
Congressional Budget Office, the Bureau of Labor
Statistics and the Social Security Administration
differ, all expect a decline in the participation
rate in the years ahead.
Of course, a decline in the rate of participation
does not necessarily imply that either the level
of, or rate of change in, labor supply itself will
decrease, because the U.S. population continues
to grow. Smaller fractions of a larger total popu-
lation may still translate into greater absolute
numbers of people working over time. Unfortu-
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2 These are derived from the Social Security Bulletin: Annual Statistical Supplement, 2005.
3 These statistics are derived from the National Center for Health Statistics at http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/fastats/lifexpec.htm.nately, two additional trends are working against
this possibility. First, while the U.S. population
is growing, its rate of growth is likely to slow in
the future. Second, for many decades, there has
been a secular decrease in the average weekly
hours worked by employees in the non-farm U.S.
business sector, and this decrease is unlikely to
turn around in coming years (Aaronson et al.,
2006).
IMPLICATIONS FOR THE U.S.
ECONOMY’S FUTURE
If these projections hold true, the U.S. econ-
omy will face some daunting challenges in the
coming decades. In particular, because labor
represents the largest single input in U.S. produc-
tion, GDP—which measures the total value of
the goods and services our economy generates—
may begin to exhibit slower rates of growth over
time. Because income for the country as a whole
depends on production, slower growth in GDP
and income implies slower growth in consump-
tion of U.S. households. Thus, a decrease in labor
supply growth will lead to slower growth in our
well-being.
In addition, as noted recently by Fed
Chairman Ben Bernanke, a decrease in the frac-
tion of the U.S. population at work will present a
number of fiscal challenges for our government.4
Most obviously, as the rate of labor income growth
slows, the growth of tax revenue will also begin
to diminish, threatening the viability of programs
such as Social Security and Medicare, which have
outlays that are expected to double as a fraction
of GDP by 2050, as well as our ability to increase
discretionary spending, including military
expenditures.
How might we respond to these challenges?
The current path of spending and taxation, cer-
tainly, can be altered, and suggestions of this type
have been offered by many influential writers
and speakers. We should be open to multiple
avenues to address the challenges ahead. We
should not rule out additional steps to encourage
those who might otherwise retire to remain in
the labor force longer. And we need to examine
ways to increase productivity—to obtain more
output per hour of labor input.
Our nation’s capital stock—our office build-
ings, factories and equipment—is like labor, a
fundamental input into the production of goods
and services. Increasing our capital stock, there-
fore, provides a means to boost production in the
face of declining labor input. Because investment
in capital depends directly on how much our
economy, including our federal government, saves,
it is in our interest to place greater emphasis on
policies that encourage higher rates of saving.
We can increase the productivity of working
individuals by increasing levels of education
among our population. Policies aimed at improv-
ing the effectiveness of primary and secondary
education, curtailing the rate at which students
drop out of school and increasing access to post-
secondary education, for example, would be
instrumental in making our labor force more
productive.
Productivity also depends on developing
more efficient production methods; that is, on
the creation of new ideas and discoveries through
research. A recent study of long-run trends in
economic growth suggests that roughly half of
the U.S. economy’s growth during the second
half of the 20th century can be linked to rising
research activity (Jones, 2002). Continued devo-
tion of resources to scientific research, therefore,
would help to ensure that our economy continues
to expand. Translating research into actual pro-
duction requires that we enhance, where possible,
entrepreneurial activity by maintaining adequate
rewards and reducing burdensome regulation
that yields more costs than benefits.
Economists, of course, have long stressed
that productivity growth is the key to rising living
standards, and perhaps accordingly, have offered
suggestions similar to those I have just outlined.
4 These remarks, entitled “The Coming Demographic Transition: Will We Treat Future Generations Fairly?” were given at the Washington
Economic Club on October 4, 2006.
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not pursuing these types of strategies are likely
to rise in the years ahead. In the face of an impend-
ing slowdown in the growth of our economy’s
labor force, productivity growth has become more
crucial than ever.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
Although the direction of effects from the
aging baby-boom generation on labor force growth
is clear, the magnitude is not. A paper published
earlier this year in the Brookings Papers on
Economic Activity (Aaronson et al., 2006) con-
tains a summary table reporting four different
projections of labor force growth out to 2014 based
on the authors’ model and estimates from the
Congressional Budget Office, the Bureau of Labor
Statistics and the Social Security Administration.
For 2007, the projections range from a low of 0.6
percent growth to a high of 1.1 percent growth.
For 2014, the projections range from a low of 0.2
percent to a high of 0.8 percent.
The magnitude of these differences is stun-
ning. Based on these projections, if the unemploy-
ment rate remains about steady next year we can
expect average monthly growth of employment
ranging from a low of about 70,000 to a high of
about 120,000. These are rough, rounded off esti-
mates—to provide the estimates any other way
would imply a false sense of precision. On the
same basis, in 2014, the range is from about
30,000 to about 100,000 new jobs each month.
These are very large differences. Moreover, given
that each of the models used to produce these
estimates is subject to error, in fact the range of
uncertainty is even greater than the numbers just
quoted.
It is important to digest not only the large
differences in these estimates but also the large
change now taking place in the labor market.
From 1996 through 1999, we became accustomed
to job growth in the neighborhood of 250,000 per
month. In 2004-05, job growth averaged about
170,000 per month. With the baby-boom genera-
tion starting to retire, we’ll have to change our
view of normal job creation. Not to do so will
invite a serious misperception of the state of the
labor market.
Uncertainty over trend labor force growth
will complicate the Fed’s job next year. While we
know that there is no long-run tradeoff between
inflation and unemployment, policymakers try
to maintain an equilibrium in the labor market at
approximately full employment both because full
employment is an important goal and because
avoiding short-run strains in the labor market
helps to maintain price stability. If actual employ-
ment growth slows, we will have to make the
judgment as to whether the slowing is consistent
with a slowing of trend labor force growth or is
a sign of impending recession. If employment
growth next year remains only modestly below
this year’s average pace of about 150,000 per
month, we will have to make the judgment as to
whether this growth is outrunning available labor,
which would be the case if we accept the low
estimate of trend labor force growth, or whether
one of the higher estimates of trend labor force
growth is being realized. To make this judgment,
we will have to collate as many different scraps
of information we can find to supplement the
standard labor force statistics released every
month.
For many years now economists have been
discussing the long-run implications of retirement
of the baby-boom generation. And I suspect that
those debates will intensify now that the retire-
ment wave is beginning. What we did not expect
is that there would be so much uncertainty about
the size of the wave when it started. The life of
the monetary policymaker is always interesting,
that is for sure!
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